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Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions
Chronique de législation et de jurisprudence
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AMENDMENT OF THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA
ACT-ROLE OF THE PROVINCES .--1n Reference re Amendment of the
Constitution of Canada (1981) 1 the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the package of constitutional amendments proposed by Prime
Minister Trudeau could, as a matter of law, go forward for enactment
by the United Kingdom Parliament without the consent of the pro-
vinces ; as a matter of convention, however, the consent of the prov-
inces was required . This comment will examine that decision .
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was rendered on
September 28th, 1981 . After the decision anew round of discussions
between the Prime Minister and the Premiers yielded an agreement on
November 5th, 1981 on the essentials of an alteredpackage of amend-
ments . (A few elements were agreed to later that same month.) The
changes, principally affecting the charter of rights and the amending
formula, are not significant for the purpose of this comment. Thenew
version of the amendments was embodied in a resolution which was
adopted by the House of Commons on December 2nd, 1981 and by the
Senate on December 8th, 1981 . At the time of writing (February
1982) this is the version which has been sent to the United Kingdom
for enactment by the United Kingdom, although it has not yet been
enacted .
Unfortunately, the agreement of November 5th, 1981, which
supports the current version of the amendments, included only nine of
the ten Premiers, Premier Levesque of Quebec being the oddmanout.
The National Assembly of Quebec, on December 1st, 1981, passed a
resolution formally expressing its dissent from the amendments . The
government of Quebec then directed a reference to the Quebec Court
1 (1981), 125D.L.R . (3d) I (S.C .C .) . Four opinions were written, none attributed
to an individual judge. These will hereafter be referred to as : (1) majority opinion on
law, which was signed by Laskin C.J ., Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard
and Lamer JJ ., (2) dissenting opinion on law, which was signed by Martland andRitchie
JJ ., (3) majority opinion on convention, which was signed by Martland, Ritchie,
Dickson, Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ ., and (4) dissenting opinion on convention,
which was signed by Laskin C .J . . Estey and McIntyre JJ .
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of Appeal calling for a decision as to whether Quebec's consent is
necessary, by convention, as a precondition to the passage of the
proposed amendments. At the time of writing it seems unlikely that
this new litigation will stop the enactment of the proposed amend-
ments by the United Kingdom Parliament ; and, if the United Kingdom
Parliament does enact the amendments, Quebec's reference (which
seeks only a decision as to the applicable constitutional convention,
not a decision as to the law) will presumably become moot . 3
The enactment of the amendments will also rob the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision (the subject of this comment) of much of
its significance . The new amendments will incorporate into the Brit
ish North America Act`s (to be renamed the Constitution Act) an
amending formula (or, to be exact, six different amending formulas)
which will for the first time eliminate the role of the United Kingdom
Parliament and stipulate the precise roles of the federal and provincial
levels of government in future amendments to the Act . In future,
therefore, aside from any problems of interpreting the complex new
amending formulas, the law (and convention) regarding provincial
participation in the amending process will be settled by the provisions
ofthe Constitution Act. Thus, despite the enormous political import-
ance of the decision at the time of its announcement (which was
televised for the first time), its importance in the longer term is more
doubtful . However, the fundamental character of the issues pre-
sented, the subtlety of the competing arguments, and above all the
role of the Supreme Court of Canada as an arbiter of essentially
political controversies, have stimulated this comment .
Facts
The first version of the constitutional amendments was intro-
duced by Prime Minister Trudeau into the House of Commons on
October 6th, 1980 . It was entitled "Proposed Resolution for a Joint
Address to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the Constitution of
Canada" . As the name indicates, it was an "address" to the Queen
(the government of the United Kingdom) requesting her to lay before
the Parliament of the United Kingdom the bill that would accomplish
the proposed amendments. The draft bill was incorporated in the
address . The address was to be passed by both Houses of the federal
Parliament and transmitted to the United Kingdom by the Governor
Globe and Mail . Toronto, Dec. 3rd, 1981, which supplies the full text of the
question .
s The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which is the subject of this
comment, supra, footnote 1, does of course provide a precedent for the answer of a
question which carries no legal consequences : infra.
' British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (Imp .) ; R.S .C ., 1970,
Appendix II . No . 5; hereinafter referred to as the B .N .A . Act.
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General for enactment by the Parliament of the United Kingdom .
The resolution was passed with some amendments by the House
of Commons on April 23rd, 1981 and by the Senate on April 24th,
1981 ; and it was this amended version which was considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada . (As noted earlier, after the decision a third
version was adopted by the House of Commons and the Senate to give
effect to the federal-provincial agreement of November 5th, 1981 .)
The leading features of the constitutional resolution in the
(second) version in which it reached the Supreme Court of Canada
(and in its third and presumably final version) were as follows : (1)
new amending formulas which would enable the British North
America Act (to be renamed the Constitution Act) to be amended in
future without resort to the United Kingdom ; (2) the relinquishment
by the United Kingdom Parliament of its residual power to legislate
for Canada (this is the "patriation" of the constitution) ; (3) a charter
of rights which would protect various civil liberties from impairment
by either the federal Parliament or the provincial Legislatures ; and (4)
a new provincial power over natural resources which would expand
provincial power to tax and control natural resources . 5
These proposals had a considerable potential impact on the prov-
inces . The clearest adverse effect on provincial powers flowed from
the proposed charter of rights which would have the effect of limiting
the powers of the provincial Legislatures to enact laws curtailing the
civil liberties defined in the charter . The proposed amending formula
also affected the provinces in that it would enable future amendments
to be made either with the consent of a specially-composed majority
of the provinces or under the authority of a referendum which would
bypass the provincial governments altogether . (The final version
involved a new set of amending procedures which did not include a
referendum .) The new resources clause added a new legislative power
to the provincial Legislatures . It was obvious that the proposals had a
serious effect on provincial legislative powers, and the Supreme
Court decision started from that premise .6
Despite . the impact on the provinces of the new constitutional
proposals, Prime Minister Trudeau had introduced them into the
s These amendments are to be accomplished by the enactment by the United
Kingdom Parliament of a statute called the Canada Act 1982, which includes as a
schedule the Constitution Act, 1982 . The Canada Act would accomplish the "patria
tion" of the constitution by a provision abrogating the power of the United Kingdom
Parliament to make laws for Canada . The Constitution Act, 1982 includes the amending
formulas, the charter of rights and the resources clause . The Constitution Act, 1982
would also change the name of the B.N.A . Act, 1867 to the Constitution Act, 1867 .
6 The firstquestion dealtwith by the court related to the impact onthe provinces of
the proposals, and the court emphasized that the charter of rights would limit the
legislative powers oftheprovinces: majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at p. 20 .
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federal House of Commons, and proposed their passage by joint
resolution of the two Houses (as a prelude to enactment by the United
Kingdom Parliament), without the consent of the provinces . At the
time of the Supreme Court decision New Brunswick and Ontario were
the only provinces which had agreed to the proposals ; the other eight
provinces were opposed . The controversy in the country at large and
in the courts was whether the proposals could or should proceed with
the consent of only two of the ten provinces and in spite of the
objection of the other eight provinces .
The package of amendments proposed by Prime Minister
Trudeau represented a stage in the search for a domestic amending
formula which had been going on intermittently since 1927 and
intensively since 1968 . For Prime Minister Trudeau, who has held
office with only one brief interruption since 1968, constitutional
reform has been a major objective, but he has never been able to
assemble a package ofamendments which would command the agree-
ment of the ten provincial Premiers . The latest round of constitutional
discussions was stimulated by the Quebec referendum on sovereign-
ty-association which was defeated on May 20th, 1980 by a popular
vote of sixty per cent to forty per cent . In the referendum campaign,
the federalist forces promised that a "no" to sovereignty-association
was not a vote for the status quo, and that the defeat of the referendum
would be followed by constitutional change to better accommodate
Quebec's aspirations . But even this commitment, although shared by
the provincial Premiers and the Prime Minister, was not sufficient to
secure agreement on specifics at federal-provincial conferences
which lasted through the summer and early fall of 1980 . Faced with
yet another failure to achieve a consensus, Prime Minister Trudeau
decided that the federal government should proceed, unilaterally if
necessary, for the patriation of the constitution (including an am-
ending formula) and a charter of rights . (The natural resources clause
was added to the proposals later .) He therefore introduced his propos-
als into the federal Parliament, and used the government majorities in
both Houses to secure the passage of the necessary resolution (with
some changes) . But, as noted earlier, at the time of the Supreme Court
of Canada decision, although the resolution had been passed by both
Houses of the federal Parliament, it was supported by only two
provincial governments and opposed by the other eight .
Proceedings
The governments of Manitoba, Newfoundland and Quebec each
directed a reference to the Court of Appeal of the province with a view
to testing the constitutionality of the federal proposals . The questions
posed in the Manitoba reference were as follows :
1 . If the amendments to the Constitution of Canada sought in the "Proposed
Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the
1982]
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Constitution of Canada", or any of them, were enacted, would federal-
provincial relationships or the powers, rights or privileges granted or secured
by the Constitution of Canada to the provinces, their legislatures or govern-
ments be affected and if so, in what respect or respects?
2 . Is it a constitutional convention that the House of Commons and Senate of
Canada will not request Her Majesty the Queen to lay before the Parliament of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland a measure to amend
the Constitution of Canada affecting federal-provincial relationships or the
powers, rights or privileges granted or secured by the Constitution ofCanada
to the provinces, their legislatures or governments without first obtaining the
agreement of the provinces?
3. Is the agreement of the provinces of Canada constitutionally required for
amendment to the Constitution of Canada where such amendment affects
federal-provincial relationships or alters the powers, rights or privileges
granted or secured by the Constitution of Canada to the provinces, their
legislatures or governments?
The same three questions were posed in the Newfoundland reference
with the addition of a fourth question, relating specifically to
Newfoundland which will not be discussed in this comment.'
The questions posed in the Quebec reference were similar in
substance, but they were differently formulated as follows :
A. If the Canada Act and the Constitution Act 1981 should come into force and if
they should be valid in all respects in Canada would they affect :
(i)	thelegislative competence of the provincial legislatures in virtue ofthe
Canadian Constitution?
(ii) the status or role oftheprovincial legislatures or governments withinthe
Canadian Federation?
B . Does the Canadian Constitution empower, whether by statute, convention or
otherwise, the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada to cause the
Canadian Constitution tobe amended withoutthe consentofthe provinces and
in spite of the objection of several of them, in such a manner as to affect :
(i)	thelegislative competence of the provincial legislatures in virtue ofthe
Canadian Constitution?
(ii) the status or role ofthe provincial legislatures or governments within the
Canadian Federation?
In the lower courts a variety' of answers were given to the
questions . The Manitoba Court of Appeal, by majorities which dif-
fered on each question, refused to measure the effects on the prov
inces of the proposed amendments (question 1) on the ground that it
would be premature to do so since they might be changed ; answered
no to the question whether there was a "constitutional convention"
' The fourth question in the Newfoundland reference essentially asked whetherthe
proposed amending formula would authorize changes in the Terms of Union of
Newfoundland without the consent of the province, and the answer of the Supreme
Court of Canada was yes (except for the province's boundaries which are protected bys.
3 of the B.N.A . Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict . , c. 28): majority opinion on law, supra, footnote
1, at pp . 47-48.
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requiring provincial consents (question 2) ; and also answered no to
the question whether provincial consents were "constitutionally re-
quired" (question 3) .x The Newfoundland Court of Appeal unani-
mously answered yes to each question, holding that the proposed
amendments did have the stipulated effects on the provinces (question
1), that there was a constitutional convention requiring provincial
consents for such amendments (question 2), and that provincial con-
sents were "constitutionally required" (question 3) . 9 The Quebec
Court of Appeal unanimously answered yes to the question whether
the proposed amendments would affect the legislative competence of
the provinces (question A(i)) and the status or role of the provinces
(question A(ii)) ; and by a majority answered yes to the question
whether the constitution could be so amended without the consent of
the provinces (question B(i), ( ii )) . 10 Thus, the federal side prevailed
in the Manitoba and Quebec courts, and the provincial side prevailed
in the Newfoundland court .
The decisions of the provincial Courts of Appeal were appealed
to the Supreme Court of Canada . In the Supreme Court of Canada
eight of the ten provinces supported the position that the federal
initiative was contrary to constitutional convention and constitutional
law . On the other side the federal government was joined by New
Brunswick and Ontario to argue that the federal initiative was in
accordance with constitutional convention and constitutional law .
The Supreme Court of Canada held unanimously that the proposed
amendments would significantly affect the provinces in the ways stipu-
lated by the various questions . The court then held by a majority ofseven
to two (Laskin C.J ., Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard and
Lamer JJ., with Martland and Ritchie JJ . dissenting) that the agreement
of the provinces to the proposed amendments was not constitutionally
required "as a matter of law" . The court then held by a majority ofsix to
three (Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ .,
with Laskin C.J ., Estey and McIntyre JJ . dissenting) that there was a
constitutional convention requiring the agreement of the provinces to an
amendment ofthe kind proposed, and that the agreement of the provinces
was constitutionally required "as a matter ofconstitutional convention" .
In sum, the court addressed itself separately to the laws of the constitution
and to the conventions ofthe constitution, holding the federal initiative to
be authorized by law but unauthorized by convention .
'Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (No . I) (1981), 117
D.L.R . (3d) (1 Man . C.A .) .
s Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (No . 2) (1981), 118
D.L.R . (3d) 1 (Nfld C.A .) .
Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (No . 3) (1981), 120
D.L.R . (3d) 385 (Que . C.A .) .
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A formal peculiarity of the decision is that the legal question and
the conventional question are treated in separate opinions so that each
judge signed two opinions, one on the law and another on the conven
tion . Since there is a majority opinion and a dissenting opinion on
each issue, there is a total of four opinions . Another formal peculiar-
ity of the decision is that the principal author of each opinion is not
identified : the majority opinion on the law (majority opinion on law)
is the opinion of seven judges . The majority opinion on the conven-
tion (majority opinion on convention) is the opinion of six judges.' 1
Four judges, namely, Dickson, Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ.,
were part of the majority of seven answering no to the legal question
and were also part of the majority of six answering yes to the conven-
tion question .
Ifthe court had followed the usual format for split decisions, this
four-judge group would not have signed two separate majority opin-
ions but would have written a single opinion dealing with both ques
tions, with each of the remaining five judges adhereing to the part he
agreed to and dissenting from (or at least writing separately on) the
part he did not agree to . This usual format would have required the
four-judge group to write a single, coherent opinion, in which the
answer to the legal question was reconciled with the answer to the
convention question . As the separate opinions now stand, the answers
are not literally inconsistent : obviously, one can say that something is
in accordance with the law but is contrary to convention . But the tone
and thrust of the two opinions is so different that it is hard to see how
the four-judge group could have signed both opinions . The majority
opinion on the legal question is sympathetic to the federal initiative . 12
The majority opinion on the convention question is hostile to the
federal initiative . l3 The result is rather confusing . Indeed, after the
1 1 For the mode of citation to be used hereafter, see supra, footnote 1 . Multiple-
author opinions are notuncommon in the High Court ofAustralia and the Supreme Court
ofthe United States, but I think the only Supreme Court ofCanada precedents are a few
cases in which the court has been unanimous and in which the sole opinion is described
as that of "the court" : Re Offshore MineralRights ofB.C., [1967] S.C .R . 792 ; A .-G .
Que . v . Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R . 1016 ;A .-G . Man . v . Forest, [197912 S.C.R . 1032 ; Re
Upper House, [198011 S .C.R . 54 ; A.-G . Que . v . Blaikie (No . 2) (1981), 123 D .L.R .
(3d) 15 (S.C.C .) .
12 It is hard to provide authority for "tone and thrust", but see e .g ., supra,
footnote 1, at pp . 33 ("we must operate the old machinery perhaps one more time"), 41
("the completion of an incomplete constitution", "a finishing operation") .
's See e.g ., ibid ., at pp . 104 ("The federal principle cannot be reconciled with a
state of affairs where the modification of provincial legislative powerscould be obtained
by the unilateral action of the federal authorities"), 106 ("the anomaly that theHouse of
Commons and Senate could obtain by simple resolutions what they could not validly
accomplish by statute") . Note also the discrepancies between the opinions on the
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result was announced, both sides claimed to have won the case . Of
course, in law the federal side had won ; but that result was obscured
by the language used in the majority opinion on convention . If the
four-judge group had written a single opinion dealing with both
questions they would have had to reconcile the two parts of the
decision, and the result would have been much clearer .
It could be argued that the obscurity of the result, offering
something to both sides, was politically sound, since it helped to
persuade both sides that an agreement should be reached-and of
course, when the bargaining resumed, an agreement (albeit an agree-
ment which isolated Quebec) was in fact reached . But this argument
assumes the propriety of the court acting outside its legal function and
attempting to facilitate a political outcome. Indeed, the onlyjustifica-
tion for even considering the convention question would be to influ-
ence the political outcome-a justification which will be criticized
later in this comment .
Background
The B .N .A . Act differs from the constitutions of the United
States and Australia (and other federal countries) in that it contains no
general provision for its own amendment . t o As an imperial statute it
could be amended only by the United Kingdom Parliament at West-
minster . In 1931 the Statute of Westminster' s conferred upon Canada
(and the other Dominions) the power to repeal or amend imperial
statutes applying to Canada . But, at Canada's insistence, the B.N .A .
Act was excluded from this new power . Section 7(1) of the Statute of
Westminster provided that its provisions did not extend to the repeal,
amendment or alteration of the B .N.A. Act . This provision was
inserted so that the B .N.A . Act could not be amended by an ordinary
statute of either the federal Parliament or a provincial Legislature.' The
idea was, and still is, that a constitution should be more difficult to amend
than the Income Tax Act . 17
" Limited powers of amendment are granted by ss 91(1), 92(1) and some other
provisions of the B.N.A . Act .
's 22 Geo . V, c . 4 (Imp .) ; R .S .C ., 1970, Appendix II, No . 26 .
16 It is doubtful whether s . 7(1) was really necessary to protect the B .N.A . Act from
fundamental change : Wheare, Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (1960),
p . 69 .
17 An irony of the present decision is that a resolution of the two Houses of
Parliament is all that is necessary to initiate an amendment . If this resolution must be
complied with automatically by the United Kingdom Parliament, then, as a matter of
law, the constitution is just as easy to amend as the Income Tax Act . The objecting
provinces argued that the Statute of Westminster, especially s . 7(3) . implicitly forbade
any alteration of provincial legislative powers without the consent of the provinces . This
argument was rejected : majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at p . 40 .
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After the Statute of Westminster, while other imperial statutes
had lost their protected status, the B .N .A . Actcould still be amended
only by the United KingdomParliament . This did not mean,however,
that the amending process was outside the control of Canadians. At an
imperial conference in 1930 (the same conference that recommended
the enactment of the Statute of Westminster) it was agreed by the
Prime Ministers of all the Dominions that the United KingdomParlia-
ment would not enact any statute applying to aDominion except at the
request and with the consent of that Dominion." This agreement,
which reflected already longstanding practice, created a constitution-
al convention which has never been departed from. This convention
means that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not enact an
amendment to the B.N.A. Act except at the request and with the
consent of Canada .
The convention does not stipulate which governmental bodies in
Canada should make the request for, and give the consent to, pro-
posed amendments to the B.N.A . Act. However, long before 1930 the
practice had developed of requesting amendments by a "joint
address" of the Canadian House of Commons and the Canadian
Senate . Thejoint address consists of a resolution which requests the
United Kingdom government to lay before the United Kingdom
Parliament a bill to accomplish the desired amendment; the text ofthe
bill is included in the resolution . After the resolution has been passed
by thetwo Houses of Parliament it is sent by the Governor General to
the United Kingdom government for enactment . This is the procedure
which is being followed for enactment of the current proposals .
The provinces play no role in the amending process which has
just been described. Moreover, there has been no consistent practice
by the federal government of obtaining the consent of the provinces
before requesting an amendment. The United Kingdom Parliament
has enacted fifteen important amendments to the B.N.A . Act since
confederation. Only four of these-in 1940, 1951, 1960 and 1964-
were preceded by the unanimous consent of the provinces . l4 One
other-in 1907-was preceded by consultation with the provinces
(British Columbia opposed the amendment) . The remaining amend-
ments were requested byjoint address ofthe two Houses ofthe federal
' 8 The convention is recited as a preamble to the Statute of Westminster. It is not
enacted by the Statute of Westminster, because it was thought in 1931 that the United
Kingdom Parliament was incompetent to limit its own sovereignty . However, s. 4 ofthe
Statute ofWestminster reinforcedthe convention by providing that no Act of theUnited
Kingdom Parliament wouldextend to a Dominion "unless it is expressly declared in that
Act that the Dominion has reqùested, and consented to, the enactment thereof" .
' 9 The StatuteofWestminster, 1931, supra, footnote 15, which wasnot literally an
amendment to the B .N.A . Act, but which added to the powers of the federal Parliament
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Parliament and enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament Without
prior consultation with the provinces . Z°
The four amendments which were preceded by unanimous pro-
vincial consent include the only amendments which have altered the
distribution of legislative powers within Canada . Three of these
unanimous-consent amendments2t shifted a legislative power from
the provincial Legislatures to the federal Parliament : (1) over unem-
ployment insurance '22 (2) over old age pension S,23 and (3) over
supplementary benefits. These three amendments are the only ones
which have altered the distribution of legislative powers between the
federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures . 25 Since each of
these amendments was preceded by the unanimous consent of the
" The amendments are listed, with information on provincial consultation and
consent, in Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd ed . rev ., 1969), pp . 33-34 . For
fuller accounts of the history of constitutional amendment in Canada, see Gérin-Lajoie,
Constitutional Amendment in Canada (1950) ; Livingston, Federalism and Constitution-
al Change (1956), ch . 2 ; Favreau . The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada
(Government of Canada, 1965) ; Lalonde and Basford, The Canadian Constitution and
Constitutional Amendment (Government of Canada, 1978) . The Favreau summary,
which lists 22 alleged amendments, is reproduced in Re UpperHouse, [198011 S .C .R .
54, at p . 60 and in the present case, supra, footnote 1, in no less than three places :
dissenting opinion on law, at p . 62 ; majority opinion on convention at p . 91 ; dissenting
opinion on convention, at p . 116 .
21 The fourth amendment, namely, British North America Act, 1960 . 9 Eliz . 11, c .
2 (Imp .) ; R .S . C ., 1970 . Apendix II, No . 36, substituted a new s . 99 of the B.N.A . Act,
imposing a retiring age on superior court judges .
22 British North America Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo . VI, c . 36 (Imp .) ; R .S .C ., 1970,
Appendix 11, No . 27, adding s . 91 (2A) to the B.N.A . Act .
2s BritishNorth America Act, 1951, 14& 15 Geo . VI, c . 32 (1mp . ) ; R .S .C ., 1970,
Appendix II, No . 33 . adding s . 94A to the B .N.A . Act .
24 British North America Act, 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz . 11, c . 73 (Imp .) ; R.S .C ., 1970,
Appendix II, No . 37 . amending the new s . 94A of the B.N.A . Act .
25 The first of the three amendments (1940) clearly had this effect, since it
transferred the power over unemployment insurance from the exclusive authority of the
provincial Legislatures to the exlusive authority of the federal Parliament . The second
and third amendments (1951 and 1964) are less clear in that the new s . 94A which they
introduced (1951) and substituted (1964) conferred a new power on the federal Parlia-
ment which was merely concurrent, and in addition expressly withheld the power to
"affect the operation of any law present or future of a provincial Legislature" . It is
arguable therefore that the 1951 and 1964 amendments are more closely analogous to the
1949 amendment which conferred on the federal Parliament the power to amend the
constitution of Canada in certain limited ways without detracting from provincial
powers: British North America Act (No . 2), 1949, 13 Geo . VI, c . 81 (Imp .) ; R .S .C .,
1970 . Appendix II . No, 31 ; this 1949 amendment was not preceded by provincial
consents . As noted, supra, footnote 19, another relevant precedent is the Statute of
Westminster, which although not an amendment ofthe B .N.A . Act, conferred upon the
federal Parliament the power to legislate with extraterritorial effect and upon both the
federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures the power to repeal or amend imperial
statutes in force in Canada (other than the B.N.A . Act) ; the enactment of the Statute of
Westminster was preceded by unanimous provincial consent .
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provinces, there has been an invariable practice of securing provincial
consents to amendments altering the distribution of powers .26
Convention requiring provincial consents
The federal government's invariable past practice, of obtaining
the consents of all the provinces before proceeding with an amend-
ment affecting provincial powers, naturally invites the question
whether there is an obligation to obtain the consents ofthe provinces .
Such an obligation couldbe imposed by a constitutional convention or
by a constitutional law . The questions put to the court by Manitoba,
Newfoundland and Quebec called upon the court not only to decide
the legal issue, whether there was an obligation imposed by law, but
also to decide the nonlegal issue, whether there was an obligation
imposedby convention . Question 2 ofthe questions put to the courtby
Manitoba and Newfoundland asked whether there was a "con-
stitutional convention" requiring "the agreement of the provinces" ;
and question 3 of the questions put to the court by Quebec asked
whether "by statute, convention or otherwise", the constitution em-
powered the federal Houses to proceed with an amendment "without
the consent of the provinces and in spite of the objection of several of
them" .
I expected the court to refuse to rule on the existence of a
convention, on the ground that the issue was not justiciable ; and for
reasons which I will give later in this comment I still believe that the
court should not have answered this question . However, as explained,
the court did answer the question . Indeed, the court was unanimous
that the question should be answered . The court then divided on the
answer : a six-judge majority (Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz,
Chouinard and Lamer JJ .) held that there was a convention requiring
provincial consent for an amendment which like the present proposals
purported to change provincial legislative powers or provide a
mechanism which could effect a change of provincial legislative
powers ; the three dissenters (Laskin C .J ., Estey and McIntyre JJ.)
held that there was no such convention .
A convention differs from a mere usage or practice in that it is
normative : the persons to whom the convention applies must feel
obliged to follow it . In order to decide whether there was a convention
in this instance the court looked at three questions : (1) what were the
precedents? (2) did the actors in the precedents believe that they were
bound by the rule? and (3) was there a reason for the rule?"
26 There are negative precedents as well in that amendments proposed by the
federal government in 1951, 1960, 1964, and 1971 which were agreed to by allbut one
or two provinces were not proceeded with for lack of unanimity: majority opinion on
convention, supra, footnote 1, at p . 94 .
Z' The three questions were taken from Jennings, The Law and the Constitution
(5th ed ., 1959), p . 136. The third question seems otiose, except as casting light on the
answer to the second question .
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With respect to the precedents, the six-judge majority surveyed
the prior amendments (which were briefly described earlier in this
comment) and concluded that there had been an invariable practice of
obtaining provincial consent to amendments which made a change in
legislative powers . With respect to the belief ofthe actors, the major-
ity concluded from statements in a federal white paper and by various
federal ministers that the actors on the federal side did feel bound to
obtain the consent of the provinces to amendments changing legisla-
tive powers. With respect to the reason for the rule, the court found
that the reason was "the federal principle" which required that a
modification of provincial powers should not be obtainable "by the
unilateral action of the federal authorities" .29
Having decided that there was a convention, the six-judge major-
ity had to decide what the convention was . They held that the conven-
tion required "a substantial degree" or "a substantial measure" of
provincial consent, but that it was not necessary for the court to decide
what the required degree or measure was . 30 It was enough for the
court to say that the current proposals, having been agreed to by only
New Brunswick and Ontario, did not have "a sufficient measure of
provincial agreement" .3I The court thus rejected the unanimity rule32
which had been contended for by all objecting provinces except
Saskatchewan . 33
The sixjudge majority's rejection of the unanimity rule seems
open to criticism . If the precedents evidence a convention (as the
sixjudge majority holds they do), surely they are consistent only with
unanimity . In no case was an amendment altering legislative powers
proceeded with over the objection of even a single province . If the
beliefs of the current actors are relevant (as they surely must be) is it
not rather startling that only one province (Saskatchewan) apparently
as The white paper relied upon was the Favreau paper (1965), op . cit., footnote 20 .
The court did not refer at all to the Lalonde and Basford white paper (1973), op . cit .,
footnote 20, although that paper asserted (p . 13) that the federal government was "not
constitutionally obliged" to obtain provincial consents to amendments that involve the
distribution of powers .
29 Majority opinion on convention, supra, footnote 1, at p . 104 .
3° Ibid ., at p . 103 .
31 Ibid.
32 The passage in the majority opinion on convention which refuses to rule on the
degree of provincial consent required by the convention (supra, footnote 1, at p . 103)
does not explicitly reject the unanimity rule, but I think it does so implicitly . Note also
the earlier passage in the opinion (at p . 100) in which their lordships say : "It seems clear
that while the precedents taken alone point at unanimity, the unanimity principle cannot
be said to have been accepted by all the actors in the precedents ."
33 The Attorney General of Saskatchewan argued that "a measure of provincial
agreement" was required, and that the court need not define what the required measure
was . except to hold that the agreement of only Ontario and New Brunswick was
insufficient: Factum of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan . undated, pp . 24-42 .
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believed the rule to be what the court said it was? Seven provinces
argued that unanimity was required ; two provinces and the federal
government argued that there was no convention at all. In these
circumstances, it is difficult to support the six-judge majority's
finding that there was a convention requiring only a "substantial
degree" of provincial consent. It is true, as the majority points out,"
that there were statements by federal ministers asserting that unanimi-
ty was not necessary. But since these statements were not supported
by any precedents it seems more plausible to treat the statements as
denying the existence of any convention at all, rather than as af-
firming the existence of a convention but denying that it required
unanimity . This was the view contended for by New Brunswick,
Ontario and the federal government and accepted by the three judges
(LaskinC.J ., Estey andMcIntyre JJ .) whodissented on the existence
ofthe convention .35 Thethree-judge minority also argued that so long
as the degree of provincial participation- "remains unresolved" the
supposed convention would be so uncertain as to be unworkable . the
lack of definition of the required degree of provincial participation
"prevents the formation or recognition of any convention" ..3s
The trouble with aunanimity rule, of course, is that it places the
constitution in a straightjacket . The unsuccessful efforts by meetings
of first ministers over the past fifty years to find a suitable amending
formula certainly demonstrates the inconvenience of unanimity-but
they equally demonstrate that unanimity has been the operating pre-
mise of these meetings . There has been a sentiment that a single
province or a small minority of provinces should not be coerced into
an unwanted amendment . Indeed, as the threejudge minority pointed
out, only unanimity gives full effect to the federal principle, 37 and
only unanimity avoids the acute problems of definition which would
be raised by acceptance of anything less than unanimity. It is therefore
easy to see why unanimity has been the practice of the first ministers .
What is not easy to see is why the six-judge majority of the court
wouldwant to design a different rule for the first ministers. Four ofthe
membersofthe six-judge majority also signed the seven-judge major-
ity opinion on law, in which the court said, as one reason for holding
that the convention had not crystallized into law, that a rule of
substantial provincial compliance or consent wouldnot be acceptable
as a legal rule because its uncertainty would be "an impossible
position .for aCourt to manage" .38 Theremaining twomembers ofthe
34 Majority opinion on convention, supra, footnote 1, at pp . 100-102.
3s Dissenting opinion on convention, supra, footnote 1, at p. 115.
3s Ibid ., at p . 125 .
37 Ibid .
38 Majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1 . at p. 29 . The opinion also implies
that substantial compliance is thought to be sufficient only by Professor W.R . Leder-
320
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW 1Vol . 60
six-judge majority on convention (Martland and Ritchie JJ .) had
dissented on the legal issue, holding that there was a legal requirement
of "the consent of the provinces" .39 Their lordships expressly re-
frained from deciding whether the consent had to be unanimous,40 but
the whole thrust of their reasoning would seem to lead inexorably to a
unanimity requirement . If that is so, how could a convention have
developed requiring a lesser degree of consent?
I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court of Canada's first
foray into political science did not yield very satisfactory reasoning or
conclusions . That is not surprising . The existence and definition of a
convention has to be ascertained without the help of the priorjudicial
decisions which would support a rule of common law and without the
sworn testimony and rules ofevidence which would support a finding
of fact . What the court was doing I suppose (although the judges did
not say so) was taking judicial notice of public statements and docu-
ments and inferring from that material the existence and definition of
the convention . It is extraordinarily difficult to draw a safe conclusion
from such inherently unreliable material, as is demonstrated by the
range of positions taken by the contending governments (whose be-
liefs are supposed to be relevant in ascertaining the convention) and
by the sharp difference of opinion within the court itself. Moreover,
the vagueness of the rule announced by the court leaves in doubt the
question whether the consent of the populous and predominantly
French-speaking province of Quebec is required to be part of a
"substantial degree" or a "substantial measure" of provincial con-
sent . I will return to this point in the next section of this comment .
Propriety of answering the convention question
The most important and disturbing question which is raised by
the court's answer to the question about the existence of a convention
is : why did the court answer the question at all? The court emphasized
the truism that the striking peculiarity of the conventions of the
constitution is that "in contradistinction to the laws of the constitu-
tion, they are not enforced by the courts" ." That being so, no legal
consequences could flow from the answer to the question . The con-
sequences of answering the question could only be political .
man . ("The position advocated is all the more unacceptable when substantial provincial
compliance or consent is by him (i.e ., by Professor Lederman] said to be sufficient .")
This appears to overlook the fact that the six-judge opinion also regards something akin
to "substantial provincial compliance or consent" as sufficient . This is one of several
passages which makes it hard to believe that four judges signed both opinions, the tone
and thrust of which are so utterly different .
39 Dissenting opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at p . 79 .
`'° Ibid .
°' Majority opinion on convention, supra, footnote 1, at p . 84.
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The six-judge majority gave two reasons for answering the ques-
tion : (1) courts had in previous cases recognized the existence of
conventions, and (2) the question ofthe existence of the convention in
this case had been asked in the three orders of reference .42 Neither of
these reasons seems to me to be persuasive . Taking the first reason
first, while there are no cases in which a court has enforced a
convention, 43 it is true that there are a number of cases in which the
courts have recognized the existence of a convention . For example,
the courts have,taken notice of the conventions of responsible govern-
ment, involving the accountability to Parliament of Ministers of the
Crown, as a consideration in deciding to give a broad rather than a
narrow interpretation to a statute conferring power on a Minister." In
these cases, and in the other cases in which the existence of a conven-
tion has been recognized, 45 the existence of the convention was
relevantto the disposition of a legal issue, usually the interpretation of
either a statute or a written constitution .
The cases which have recognized the existence of a convention
establish no more than the proposition that the existence of a conven-
tion may occasionally be relevant to the determination ofalegal issue,
and where it is so relevant the court must decide it . But this is obvious .
It is equally true that a court must occasionally determine the effect of
intoxication upon human behaviour, the appropriate medical proce-
dure to deal with appendicitis, and the resistance to fire of fibreglass
insulating material . There is hardly a medical, scientific, technical or
other factual question which some court has not had to determine at
some time-but only because the resolution of that question was
necessary to dispose of a justiciable issue before the court . In the
present case the resolution of the convention question would have
been necessary to dispose of a justiciable issue if the court had
accepted the argument that a convention requiring provincial consents
had "crystallized" into a legal requirement . But, as will be explained
later in this comment, the court rejected the theory that a convention
could crystallize into law . When this theory was rejected, the
42 Ibid ., at pp . 87-88 . The three dissenting judges also agreed that it was appropri-
ate to answer the conventionquestion, giving (at p . 107) as reasons "the unusual nature
of these references" and the fact that the question had been "argued at some length
before the Court and [had] become the subject of the reasons of the majority" . The first
of these reasons is obscure, and the second seems to me to have no force at all .
43 Two cases where courts explicitly refused to enforce a convention are Reference
re Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation, [1938] S .C.R . 71 and
Madzimbamuto v . Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A.C . 645 (P.C ., Southern Rhodesia) .
44 E .g ., Liversidge v . Anderson, [1942] A.C . 206 (H.L .) ; Carltona Ltd . v . Com-
missioners of Works, [194312 All E.R . 560 (C.A .) ; cf. A .-G . Que. v . Blaiki e (No . 2)
(1981), 123 D .L.R . (3d) 15, at pp . 21-22 (S .C.C .) .
4s Numerous othercases are cited by the court, supra, footnote 1, majority opinion
on law at pp . 22-28, and majority opinion on convention at p . 88 .
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justification for answering the convention question disappeared . The
question then stood alone as a nonlegal question of no relevance to any
legal question . Courts have not in the past answered such nonlegal
questions .
The court's second reason for answering the convention question
was that the convention question was one of the questions referred to
it for an answer . This is true : the questions referred to the court by
Manitoba, Newfoundland and Quebec included the question whether
a convention exists .46 It is also true that the provincial statutes under
which the questions were referred authorized the reference of "any
matter" or "any question" and did not explicitly restrict the refer-
ence to a point of law . 47 But this is not a sufficient reason for the court
to answer the question . It is clearly established that a court has a
discretion not to answer a question posed on a reference. If the
question had called for a decision as to the effect of intoxication on
human behaviour, the appropriate medical procedure to deal with
appendicitis, or the resistance to fire of fibreglass insulating material,
and no legal consequence turned on the answer, the court would
obviously have pronounced the issue nonjusticiable and refused to
answer it .a9
While a question about the conventions of the constitution is
much closer to the traditional work of a court than biology, medicine,
chemistry or physics, it is fraught with the peculiar danger of being
one of the issues in a political controversy . One may confidently
surmise that the referring provinces asked the convention question in
case they lost on the legal question . In that event, they wanted an
answer to the convention question for the purpose of strengthening
their political position in bargaining with the federal government and
4e Manitoba and Newfoundland question 2 ; Quebec question B . The text of the
questions is set out earlier in this comment, supra .
47 The statutory provisions are set out in majority opinion on law, supra, footnote
1, at p . 16 .
as A .-G . Ont . v . A.-G . Can . (Local Prohibition), [1896] A.C . 348, at p . 370,
refusing to answer questions which "have not as yet given rise to any real and present
controversy" and are therefore "academic rather than judicial" : A .-G . B .C . v . A.-G .
Can . (Fishing Rights) . [ 1914] A.C . 153 . at p . 162, refusing to answer questions "of a
kind which it is impossibletoanswer satisfactorily" ; Reference re UpperHouse (1979),
102 D.L.R . (3d) I, at p . 16 (S .C .C .), refusing to answer questions that were too vague
"in the absence of a factual context or actual draft legislation" ; and in the present case,
supra, footnote 1, at p . 16 (majority opinion on law), asserting the power to refuse to
answer "questions which may not be justiciable" . and at p . 107 (dissenting opinion on
convention) to the same effect .
`'° In the Manitoba Court of Appeal (supra, footnote 8) three judges refused to
answer question 1 and one judge refused to answer question 2 . In the Newfoundland
Court of Appeal (supra, footnote 9) and the Quebec Court of Appeal (supra, footnote
10) all judges answered all questions .
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if necessary lobbying the United Kingdom government and
Parliament." If this was the provincial plan, it worked perfectly : the
objecting provinces came away from the decision heavily rearmed for
the next phase of the battle-a phase which was wholly political .
1 can understand the concern of the court that an answer to the
legal question only might imply judicial approval of the unilateral
federal initiative and would certainly strengthen the political position
of the federal government. But surely these are classic examples of
the kinds of considerations of which a court should not take account .
The court has no mandate to intervene in these matters . The first
ministers were elected for that purpose . The judges of the court were
not elected at all ; they were appointed, and they were appointed to
decide legal questions, not to be wise counsellors on nonlegal ques-
tions . Nor can their answer to the convention question be defended as
a kind of consensual arbitration of a point in dispute between the two
levels of government : the federal government's submission to the
court was that the convention question was not appropriate for judicial
determination, and that the question should not be answered.''
The question whether the reference procedure is a satisfactory
one for determination of constitutional issues is difficult . It is
obviously convenient to be able to secure an early ruling on the
constitutionality of a new or proposed government initiative : Yet both
the Supreme Court of the United States5' and the High Court of
Australia" have refused to entertain the reference of questions for
advisory opinions . In their view, the reference of even purely legal
questions would take them outside their judicial function because
advice to government is an executive function to be performed by the
law officers of the government. This objection seems rather theoreti-
cal at first blush, but it can be reinforced by some practical considera-
tions . One practical objection to the reference procedure is that it
sometimes leads to premature and abstract rulings on issues which
so It is interesting to compare the main ground which was offered by the objecting
provinces fortheiropposition to the proposed charter ofrights, which was, that a charter
of rightswould require the courts to decide questions which are best regarded as political
and hence not appropriate for judicial determination.
$' Factum of the Attorney-General of Canada, April 21st, 1981, p. 20 . The same
position was taken by the Attorney General for Ontario: Factumofthe Attorney General
for Ontario, undated, p. 30 . The Attorney General of New Brunswick (the other
province on the federal side of the argument) argued that theconvention question should
be answered no : Factum of the Attorney General ofNew Brunswick, April 16th, 1981,
p. 6. See also majority opinion on convention, supra, footnote 1, at p. 87 .
sz The Supreme Court of the United States has never had to formally decide the
issue, but in 1793 it refused on constitutional grounds to give an advisory opinion; the
refusal is contained in correspondence betweenthecourtand the executivebranch : Note
(1956), 69 Harv . L. Rev. 1302 .
53 Re Judiciary and Navigation Act (1921), 29 C.L.R . 257 .
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would have been better resolved in a concrete controversy .54 More
germane to our present concern is the objection that the reference
procedure gives rise to the possibility that a government will try to
manipulate a court for political purposes . Professor Paul C . Weiler
has charged, for example, that in the Manitoba Egg Reference -5 ' the
government of Manitoba enacted a marketing scheme for the purpose
of referring it to the court, and set up the reference in such a way as to
encourage a holding of invalidity."
In the present case the only consequence ofan affirmative answer
to the convention question was to influence the political outcome of
the controversy over the patriation package, and to influence it in
favour of the referring provinces . By answering the question the court
allowed itself to be manipulated into a purely political role." A
political role carries with it political risks, both to the court itself and
to the substantive issue of policy which the court seeks to influence .
The risk to the court itself was minimized in this case by the delphic
character of the decision : by offering something to both sides the risk
of attacks on the court by politicians from either side was minimized .
The risk to the substantive issue was more serious . The court had no
way of knowing whether a federal-provincial government agreement
would subsequently be reached, and it certainly could not assume that
any such agreement would be unanimous. Yet it not only undertook to
affirm the existence of a convention requiring provincial consent, but
it left deliberately vague the degree ofconsent required by the conven-
tion . In fact, as I have noted, there was a subsequent agreement, but
the agreement did not include Quebec . The broadening of provincial
agreement from two provinces to nine is no doubt a fortunate outcome
owing a good deal to the court's decision, but the isolation of Quebec
is unfortunate, and its harmful effect may well prove to have been
exacerbated by the court's decision . The convention announced by
the court leaves in doubt the question whether the consent of Quebec
must be part of a "substantial degree" or "substantial measure" of
provincial consent . There is surely a strong argument that these
phrases do not stipulate merely a high numerical measure of provin-
cial agreement (nine out of ten), but a measure of agreement which
reflects the principle of duality (implying the protection of the powers
of the only predominantly French-speaking province) . As noted
Sa Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada (1968), pp . 194-199 .
15 A.-G . Man . v . Man . Egg and Poultry Assn ., [1971] S.C .R . 689 .
56 Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian Federalism (1973), 11
Osgoode Hall L .J . 225, at pp . 226-227 .
57 One may ask whether a private individual could sue for a declaration that a
convention had been broken . Presumably, the private individual would lack both
standing and a cause of action . Yet, it now appears that a government is entitled on a
reference to have such a question answered .
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earlier, that doubt on this issue has already led to further litigation,
and (especially in Quebec) it undermines the political legitimacy of
the constitutional proposals now before the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment . As Professor Peter H. Russell has put it, the court has left us in
danger of acquiring an "unconstitutional constitution"! 5g
Law requiring provincial consents
Question 3 of the questions put to the court by Manitoba and
Newfoundland asked whether the agreement of the provinces was
"constitutionally required" for .an amendment which affected the
powers, rights or privileges of the provinces . Question B of the
questions put to the court by Quebec asked whether the constitution
"empowered" such an amendment without the consent of the prov-
inces and in spite of the objection of several .of them . The seven-judge
opinion of Laskin C.J ., Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard
and Lamer JJ . which I have been citing as the "majority opinion on
law" dealt with the, strictly legal aspect of these questions, that is to
say, it addressed the issue whether the agreement of the provinces was
required by law, as opposed to convention . The answer given, as
noted earlier, was that there was no such requirement of law .
The reasoning of the seven-judge majority boiled down to two
very simple propositions : (1) the two Houses ofParliament could as a
matter of law pass any resolution they chose, including a resolution
requesting an amendment of the B .N.A. Act; and (2) the Parliament
at Westminster could as a matter of law pass any statute for Canada it
chose, including a statute amending the B .N.A. Act . 6° Neither of
58 The court's decision leaves no doubt as to thevalidity in law of theconstitutional
proposals once enacted, but it raises the possibility that without Quebec's agreement
they will have been enacted contrary to convention and will be "unconstitutional" in
that softer sense of the word : see majority opinion on convention, supra, footnote 1, at
p. 87 (" . . . it is perfectly appropriate to say that to violate a convention is to do
something which is unconstitutional although it entails no direct legal consequence").
Professor PeterH. Russell used the phrase "unconstitutional constitution" in a panel
discussion at the Osgoode Hall LawSchool of York University on Feb. 3rd, 1982 . His
analysis of the political risk undertaken by the court is elaborated in P.H . Russell, The
Supreme Court Decision : Bold Statescraft based on Questionable Jurisprudence (1982)
to be published along with other papers on the decisionby the Institute ofIntergovemm-
ental Relations, Queen's University .
" Majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at pp . 29-30.
so The majority bpinion on law, supra, footnote 1, describes the authority over
Canada of the Parliament atWestminster as "untrammelled" (p. 34), "untouched" (p .
37), "omnipotent" (p . 39), "unimpaired" (p . 41) and "undiminished" (p . 42). It is
arguable however that the court was only discussing the Parliament at Westminster's
authority to amend the B.N.A . Act, and was not considering the (purely theoretical)
possibility of other kinds of laws . In any event, the court does not state or imply that
Canadian consent is a legal prerequisite to the validity in Canada of laws passed by the
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these propositions, in the view of the majority, was affected by
Canada's evolution to independence from the United Kingdom, by the
passage of the Statute of Westminster, or by the federal principle .
They summarized their view as follows : "The law knows nothing of
provincial consent, either to a resolution of the federal Houses or as a
condition to the exercise of United Kingdom legislative power .  61
One argument in favour of a legal requirement of provincial
consent was that the convention requiring provincial consent (which
the six-judge majority on convention held to exist) had "crystal
lized" into a rule of law . This argument was based on a paper
published by Professor W.R . Lederman who had argued that there
was a convention requiring provincial consent to important amend-
ments and that the convention was so fundamental to the federal
character of the country that it sould be regarded as having crystal-
lized into law .62 The court63 rejected this argument by holding that a
convention was inherently different from a rule of common law, the
former developing through political practice and recognition, the
latter developing through judicial determinations of justiciable
controversies .64 The court also pointed out that in many cases a
convention. i s essentially in conflict with a law ; for example, the
convention requiring a Governor General to assent to every bill duly
passed by the two Houses of Parliament is in conflict with the legal
power to refuse assent . In such cases, for example, where the Gover-
nor General had refused assent, the court's duty was to apply the law
not the convention ." The court pointed out, finally, that there was no
precedent of a convention having crystallized into law . 66 The court
concluded, therefore, that a convention could not crystallize into
law .67
si Majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at p. 47 .
6= W.R . Lederman, Constitutional Amendment and Canadian Unity, [ 19781 Law
Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 17, p . 23 .
63 The majority opinion on law rejected it explicitly : the dissenting opinion on law
did not mention it at all, relying on the federal principle to supply the legal requirement .
ea Majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at p . 22 .
6s Majority opinion on convention, supra, footnote 1, at pp . 85-86 .
66 Majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at pp. 22-28 .
67 It seems an extreme position to assert that a convention may never crystallize
into law, which is what the seven-judge majority is asserting . This assertion would be
put to the test if the United Kingdom Parliament were to enact a law for Canada without
anyrequest or consent from Canada in violation of the convention adopted in 1930 ( and
recited as apreamble to the Statute ofWestminster) that the United Kingdom Parliament
will not legislate for a Dominion except at the request and with the consent of the
Dominion . It is hard to believe that a Canadian court would accept such a law as valid in
Canada. However, it is possible that the rejection of such a law by a Canadian court
could be accomplished without the invocation of theconvention : see, infra, footnote 83,
and accompanying text .
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Themost powerful argument in favour of a legal requirement of
provincial consent was the argument accepted by the two judges
(Martland and Ritchie JJ .) who dissented on the legal question . They
held that the federal nature of the Canadian constitution imposed
limitations on the powers of the various Canadian organs of govern-
ment . One of those implicit limitations was the inability of either
level of government to curtail the powers of the other level of
government." A resolution of the two Houses of the federal Parlia-
ment whichhad as its object an amendment to the B.N.A . Act which
would curtail the powers of the provinces was inconsistent with that
federal principle. Accordingly, in this dissenting opinion, the two
Houses were held to lack the power to pass such a resolution ."
The strength of Martland and Ritchie JJ.'s dissent on the legal
question is its realistic appraisal of the nature and function of the
resolution to bepassed by the twoHouses ofParliament . They empha
sized that the re-solution was the major initiating step in the process of
amending the Canadian constitution . When the actions of the Houses
of Parliament are viewed from the perspective of their purpose (to
amend the constitution) it then becomes reasonable .to ask whether the
institutional context does not impose restraints uponthe powers ofthe
Houses . While there are no precedents applying a federal principle to
limit the power of the Houses to pass resolutions, the dissenting
judges pointed out that there are precedents which can be read as
applying a federal principle to limit the powers of the federal Parlia-
ment or provincial Legislatures to pass statutes, for example, the
Labour Conventions case° limiting federal power to implement
treaties dealing with matters otherwise within provincial jurisdiction,
theNova Scotia Interdelegation case71 limiting federal andprovincial
power to delegate away theirpowers, theAmax Potash case72 limiting
provincial power to bar recovery of taxes collected under an uncon-
stitutional statute; and the Senate Reference73 limiting federal power
to alter those institutions of central government which serve as pro-
tectors of provincial interests. In none of these cases was the limitation
on power explicit in the B.N .A . Act; it was implied by the court as an
implication from the federal character of the constitution . There is no
reason of logic or legal doctrine whyasimilar limitation could not be
6$ This principle was reinforcedbys . 7(3) ofthe Statute of Westminster: dissenting
opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at p. 78 .
69 The extensive argument is briefly summarized in dissenting opinion on law,
supra, footnote 1, at pp . 78-79 .
7' A.-G . Can. v. A .-G. Ont. (Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C . 326.
71 A.-G . N.S . v. A.-G. Can . (Nova Scotia Interdelegation), [1951] S .C.R. 31 .
7z Amax Potash v. Govt . of Sask ., [19773 2 S.C.R . 576; see also B .C . Electric
Power Corp . v. B .C . Electric Co ., [1962] S .C.R . 642.
'a Re UpperHouse, [1980] 1 S.C.R . 54 .
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inherent in the resolution power of the two Houses of Parliament . For
the seven-judge majority ofthe court, however, such a holding would
be "judicial legislation"-the retroactive creation by the courts of a
domestic amending formula .74
The weakness of Martland and Ritchie JL's dissent on the legal
question is its failure to analyze the effect of an absence of provincial
consent on the power of the United Kingdom Parliament . The dis-
senting judges carefully confine their opinion to the resolution power
of the Houses of the federal Parliament . In my view, they also needed
to consider the extent of the power ofthe United Kingdom Parliament .
After all, if the seven-judge majority were right in holding that the
United Kingdom Parliament still had untrammelled authority over
Canada, then, even if the resolution were invalid, the United King-
dom Parliament could still enact the proposed amendments and the
enactment would have to be recognized as valid by the Canadian
courts . Of course, if the resolution were held to be invalid, as the
dissenting judges thought it should be, presumably the federal gov-
ernment would not send any request to the United Kingdom govern-
ment and if it did the United Kingdom Parliament might not comply
with it . But these are political consequences, not legal ones. If the
United Kingdom Parliament is still omnipotent for Canada, then it
cannot be said that provincial consents are required by law for amend-
ment of the constitution of Canada .7s In other words, for Martland
and Ritchie JJ . to reach their conclusion that provincial consents were
required by law for the proposed amendments, they had to decide not
merely that in the absence of provincial consents the Houses of
Parliament had no authority to request the proposed amendments, but
also that in the absence of a proper request the United Kingdom
Parliament had no authority to enact the proposed amendments. Their
failure to address this latter question means that their reasoning did
not go far enough to warrant their conclusion .
The seven-judge majority opinion on law did not ignore the ques-
tion of the scope of authority of the United Kingdom Parliament . To
be sure, early in the opinion we find the proposition that "the author-
ity of the British Parliament or its practices and conventions are not
matters upon which this Court would presume to pronounce" . '6 As
the opinion continues, however, we find repeated assertions that the
British Parliament's authority over Canada is "untrammelled": it
was "untouched" by the Statute of Westminster, it remains "unim-
paired", and "undiminished' ,77 and it is certainly not subject to
" Majority opinion on law, supra, footnote l, at p. 33 .
7` B . Slattery . Westminster and the Constitution : the Effects of Patriation (19&2),
to be published in the Supreme Court Law Review .
7s Majority opinion on law, supra, footnote 1, at p. 21 .
77 Ibid ., at pp . 34, 37, 39, 41, 42 ; and see supra, footnote 60 .
1982]
	
Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions 329
"any requirement of provincial consent" ." The court therefore did
"presume to pronounce" on the authority of the British Parliament .
In the remainder of this comment I will argue that the court was wrong
to indicate any reluctance to determine the limits of the United King-
dom Parliament's authority over Canada, and (having properly de-
cided to determine those limits) was wrong to hold that the United
Kingdom Parliament's authority over Canada was unlimited.
We must start with the proposition that Canada is no longer acolony
of Britain. 71 As an independent country Canada is subject to the laws
ofthe United KingdomParliamentonly to the extent that the Canadian
courts, applying Canadian law, recognize those laws as valid . $° The
authority of the United Kingdom Parliament over Canada cannot be
determined authoritatively by the courts of the United Kingdom for
whom the issue could only arise in an accidental or peripheral way . It
is ultimately and exclusively for the Canadian courts to decide
whether any given law is valid in Canada, whether the source of that
law be the federal Parliament or a provincial Legislature or the United
Kingdom Parliament . That, in my view, is why the seven-judge
majority was wrong to indicate any reluctance to determine the limits
of the authority over Canada of the United Kingdom Parliament, and
why the two-judge minority was wrong to ignore the issue.
If it can be accepted that the extent of the authority over Canada
of the United Kingdom Parliament is a question of Canadian law
properly determinable by Canadian courts, is the short answer to that
question of Canadian law that the United Kingdom Parliament has
unlimited authority over Canada? As I have explained, that was the
answer given by the seven-judge majority.81 If we suppose that the
United Kingdom Parliament enacted a statute which purported to
apply to Canada without having obtained the request or consent of any
legislative or governmental body in Canada,82 would that statute be
recognized as valid by Canadian courts? The answer implicit in the
majority opinions in this case is yes . Thestatute would be in breach of
the convention agreed upon in 1930 (that the United KingdomParlia-
ment would not legislate for aDominion except at the request and with
the consent of that Dominion), but a mere convention cannot be
enforced in the courts, and the seven-judge majority on law tells us
?$ Ibid ., at p. 47 .
79 Canada's independence wasjudicially recognized in Re Offshore MineralRights
ofB.C ., supra, footnote 1, at p . 816.
$° Slattery, op . cit., footnote 75 .
$1 Supra, footnote 60 .
92 In order to eliminate the complications created by s. 4 of the Statute of West-
minster (supra, footnote 18), assume that s . 4 was complied with by afalse declaration
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that a convention cannot crystallize into law . The same majority adds
that the legal authority of the United Kingdom Parliament is unli-
mited . The result is that the unwanted law would be valid, and
Canada's only remedy would be in the realm of international rela-
tions, that is to say, diplomatic protests and the like .
Since there are no cases in which a Canadian court has struck
down a United Kingdom statute purporting to apply to Canada, the
Supreme Court of Canada's holding of unlimited United Kingdom
legislative authority over Canada cannot be demonstrated to be
wrong . But I think it is wrong. If the United Kingdom Parliament
were to enact a statute for Canada without any Canadian consent, it is
surely more likely that a Canadian court would hold that one of the
consequences of Canadian independence is that a statute ofthe United
Kingdom Parliament enacted without the consent of Canada is simply
not the law of Canada . Without the consent of Canada the statute has
the same status in Canadian law as a statute enacted for Canada by
Australia or the United States or Poland, that is to say, it has no status
at all - it is a nullity .83
If my argument is so far accepted, it follows that there is at least
one legal limitation on the authority of the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment . The limitation is that the United Kingdom Parliament has no
legal authority to legislate for Canada without Canada's consent . It
also follows that it is the duty of the Canadian courts, when the
occasion arises, to determine the nature of the consent which will
provide the United Kingdom Parliament with the authority to legislate
for Canada . I conclude therefore that the seven-judge majority should
have considered and determined the question of the nature of the
Canadian consent which was required for a United Kingdom statute
which would have the effect of altering provincial legislative powers .
If there were no other relevant considerations, the federal nature
of Canada's constitution would suggest that the provinces shouldjoin
in the consent to any amendment affecting their powers . This was the
" In Hogg . Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), p . 8,1 suggested this situation as
one in which the Canadian courts might give legal effect to a convention (i .e ., the
convention that the United Kingdom Parliament will not legislate for Canada except at
the request and with the consentofCanada), thus transforming the convention into a rule
of law . In the present case the dissenting opinion on convention . supra, footnote 1, at
pp . 112-113, quoted this passage but commented obiter that "it is our view that it is not
for the Courts to raise a convention to the status of a legal principle" . Professor Brian
Slattery, op . cit ., footnote 75, argues that the hypothetical unwanted United Kingdom
statute would be rejected by a Canadian court "for the simple reason that Canada is no
longer a British colony" . He says that such a statute "would possess no greater force in
Canada under Canadian law than a decree of the former Life-President in Uganda" .
Professor Slattery thus does not rely on the convention at all, but simply on the fact of
Canadian independence as having changed one of the fundamental rules of recognition
in Canadian law . With respect, his analysis seems to me to be correct .
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opinion of the Kershaw Committee, a committee of the House of
Commons in the United Kingdom, which reported in 1981 on the role
of the United Kingdom Parliament in enacting constitutional amend-
ments for Canada .84 The Kershaw Committee decided that when the
United Kingdom Parliament receives a request for the amendment of
the Canadian constitution the United Kingdom Parliament has "to
decide whether or not [the] request conveys the clearly expressed
wishes ofCanada as a whole, bearing in mind the federal character of
the Canadian constitutional system" .85 To that end, the United King-
dom Parliament is "bound to exercise its best judgment" in determin-
ing whether "a sufficient level and distribution of provincial concurr-
ence" exists ; any measure which does not enjoy the level and dis-
tribution of provincial concurrence contemplated by the proposed
amending formula would not qualify as a "proper request" and
should not be complied with . 86
The Kershaw Committee did not purport to state the policy of the
United Kingdom government, and in fact the United Kingdom gov-
ernment issued a Command paper in reply to the Kershaw Committee
which strongly implied that if the need had arisen the United Kingdom
government would have acted in accordance with a request from the
$° First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1980-81, British
North America Acts : the Role of Parliament, House of Commons (U.K .), Jan. 30th,
1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Kershaw Report) . The Kershaw Reportwas followed
by a reply issued by the Government of Canada : Chretien, The Role of the United
Kingdom in the Amendment of the Canadian Constitution (Government of Canada,
March 1981). This paper was followed by a rejoinder by the Kershaw Committee:
Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1980-81, Supplementary
Report on the British North America Acts : the Role of Parliament, House of Commons
(U.K .), April 15th, 1981 . Then after the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on
Sept . 28th, 1981 and thenine-province federal-provincial agreement onNov. 5th, 19,01,
the Kershaw Committee issued a third report recommending that the U.K . Parliament
enact the Canada Bill in spite ofQuebec's dissent : First Reportfromthe Foreign Affairs
Committee, Session 1981-82, Third Report on the British North America Acts- The
Role of Parliament . House of Commons (U.K .), Jan. i8th, 1982 .
ss Kershaw Report, para . 9-
86 Ibid., paras. 9-10 . In the Committee's third report (op. cit., footnote 84) the
Kershaw Committee recommended that the Canada Bill be enactedin spite ofQuebec's
dissent. This involved an abandonment of the test supplied in the Committee's first
reportof "a sufficient level and distribution ofprovincial concurrence", becauseunder
the previous proposed amending formula Quebec had a veto, andunder the new formula
Quebec's dissent would prevent the amendments from applying in Quebec. The Com-
mittee said in its third report that Quebec's consent was not necessary because the
Supreme Court of Canada had required only "a substantial measure of provincial
consent" and had stated that it was for the "political actors" to determine the degree of
provincial consent. This is one reading of the Supreme Court's decision, but there are
powerful arguments that Quebec's consent is necessary as part of "a substantial
measure of provincial consent", and at the time the Committee reached its confident
conclusion the question was already the subject of litigation in Canadian courts : see text
accompanying footnote 58, supra.
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Canadian federal government alone and would have urged the United
Kingdom Parliament to do the same-87 In my opinion, the position of
the United Kingdom government was correct, and that ofthe Kershaw .
Committee was incorrect . ss The fact which is overlooked by the
Kershaw Committee in these recommendations (although lipservice
is paid to it in other parts of their report) is that Canada is no longer a
British colony . It is no longer appropriate that fundamental decisions
regarding Canada's constitution should depend upon the "best judg-
ment" of a legislative body whose members are not in any way
accountable to the Canadian electorate . 89 Rather, the relations be-
tween Canada and the United Kingdom should observe the same rules
as those between other independent states . In Canada's relations with
other states Canada is one state and it is the federal government which
has the exclusive authority to speak for Canada as a whole, notwith-
standing that Canada's internal constitutional system is a federal one .
The principle of Canadian independence would thus suggest that the
request from Canada to the United Kingdom should come from the
federal government. Moreover, that is the way in which the request
has always been made in the past : since 1896 every request has taken
the form of a joint address by the two federal Houses of Parliament .
Even those requests which in fact enjoyed the unanimous consent of
the provinces took the usual form, not even reciting in the address the
existence of provincial consents ." No request in the usual form has
ever been rejected by the United Kingdom Parliament . 9t When a
province has requested an amendment independently of the federal
government (which has occurred at least nine times) the request has
always been rejected by the United Kingdom Parliament . 9--
$7 Observations by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
on the First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1980-81, Miscel-
laneous No . 26, Cmnd . 8450, Dec . 1981, especially para . 13 .
as A good deal of the third report of the Kershaw Committee (op . cit ., footnote 84)
is taken up with argument to the general effect that the Supreme Court of Canada had
vindicated the position taken by the Committee in its first and second reports . But the
Supreme Court of Canada did nothing of the sort : it neither said nor implied that the
United Kingdom Parliamentshould interpret and give effect toanyCanadian convention
regarding provincial consents . As the U,K . government pointed out in reply to the
Committee (op . cit ., footnote 87, para . 10), the court was at pains not to discuss that
question . If the court had discussed the question, in myview it would have emphatically
rejected the Committee's position for the reasons given in the following text of this
comment.
ss The Committee invited and heard the testimony of several British constitutional
lawyers, who agreed that the United Kingdom Parliament should exercise the discretion
contemplated by the Committee . The Committee did not invite or hear the testimony of
any Canadian constitutional lawyers .
°° Supra, footnote 1, majority opinion on law at p . 31 ; majority opinion on
convention at p . 98 .
9' Hogg, op . cit ., footnote 83, pp . 19-20 .
92 Ibid., p . 19, note 30 .
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In sum, therefore, while the federal principle provides cogent
ground for a requirement of provincial consents to constitutional
amendments affecting provincial powers, that requirement is opera
tive only within Canada . Its breach gives rise to political consequ-
ences only within Canada . At the point when the action of a foreign
government is invoked the principle of Canadian independence must
dominate . The United Kingdom government (and the United King-
dom Parliament) must accept the request which is made in the usual
form by the Canadian federal authority . For the United Kingdom
government or Parliament to listen officially to the provinces or
(worse) to enter upon an inquiry into the extent and sufficiency of
provincial consents must in my opinion be condemned as "an obj-
ectionable foreign interference in Canadian domestic affairs" .93
On the legal issue, therefore, I end up in agreement with the
seven-judge majority that there is no legal requirement of provincial
consents as a prerequisite to an amendment of the Canadian constitu
tion which would alter the powers of the provinces . My reasoning is
different because I cannot accept the view that the United Kingdom
Parliament's authority over Canada is as plenary as it was in colonial
times . In my view Canada's accession to independence has imposed
important limitations on the authority of the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment . The question for me, therefore, is whether a requirement of
provincial consents is one of the limitations . The question is difficult,
but I resolve it by giving priority to the principle of Canadian inde-
pendence to the extent that it comes into conflict with the principle of
federalism . On balance, therefore, I conclude that only the consent of
the federal Houses is necessary to provide the United Kingdom with
its authority over Canada .
Conclusions
1 . In my view, the court was wrong to answer the question
whether there was a constitutional convention requiring the consent of
the provinces to a constitutional amendment affecting provincial
powers . Since a convention is not judicially enforceable, no legal
consequence could flow from the answer . The only consequence of an
answer to the convention question could be a political one, namely, to
influence the political outcome of the controversy over the proposed
amendment .
93 Ibid ., p . 21 . The strongestform ofthe argumentto the contrary would assert that
the relationship between, Canada and the United Kingdom is not an external one with
respect to amendment of the B.N.A . Act. With respect to that matter (and that matter
only) the relationship is part of Canada's domestic amending machinery and must take
account of the federal principle . In my view, the force of this line of argument is not
sufficient to override the considerations of democratic accountability and Canadian
independence which are elaborated in the text .
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2 . Assuming that it was appropriate for the court to answer the
convention question, the absence of any accepted methodology to
answer the question became a big problem. In particular, what weight
was to be attributed to statements by federal Ministers denying the
existence of an obligation to obtain the consent of the provinces to
significant constitutional amendments? The majority of the court held
that these statements did not negate the existence of a convention, but
merely negated a requirement of unanimity : there was a convention,
but it called for only "a substantial degree" of provincial consent .
The more plausible conflicting interpretations of the material in my
view were either (1) that there was merely a usage lacking a normative
element (which is what the three-judge minority decided), or (2) that
there was a convention of unanimity (which is what the past practice
would suggest) . The majority's middle ground seems to me to be the
least plausible of the possible interpretations .
3 . Finally, the court was right to decide that there was no legal
requirement of the consent of the provinces . However, the seven-
judge majority should not in my view have held that there were
absolutely no limitations on the authority over Canada of the United
Kingdom Parliament . The better view is that there is a legal require-
ment of some form of Canadian consent as a precondition of the
United Kingdom Parliament's authority over Canada . The only ques-
tion then is whether that Canadian consent must include the provinces
as well as the two Houses of the federal Parliament . The reason why
provincial consents need not be included is that the relationship
between Canada and the United Kingdom is that between two inde-
pendent states, and it is not appropriate for the latter to take upon itself
the ascertainment and effectuation of provincial opinions which form
part of Canada's internal affairs .
P . W. HOGG*
* P . W . Hogg, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto . I acknow-
ledge the help of Professors Stanley A . Schiff and Brian Slattery, who read an earlier
draft of this comment and made useful suggestions for its improvement .
